

# Motivational Quantities: State-based Control for Organized Agents

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## ABSTRACT

Control for agents situated in multi-agent systems is a complex problem. This is particularly true in open, dynamic environments where resource, privacy, bandwidth, and computational limitations impose restrictions on the type of information that agents may share and the control problem solving options available to agents. The *MQ* or *motivational quantities* framework addresses these issues by evaluating candidate tasks based on the agent's organizational context and by framing control as a local agent optimization problem that approximates the global problem through the use of state and preference.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Local agent control for sophisticated agents situated in large scale multi-agent systems (MAS) in open, dynamic environments is a complex problem. Operating in open environments means that the tasks on which an agent is operating may change frequently due to new goals, new requests, or new collaborations with other agents. Interactions between tasks may change frequently as well for the same reasons. In dynamic environments, the outcome of task performance is uncertain and often unpredictable. An information agent working on the Web and collaborating with other agents is a good example of an agent situated in an open and dynamic environment.

In large scale MAS, there are additional computational and organizational issues. For example, there may be multiple organizations to which an agent belongs and the organizations may have different, or even *conflicting*, goals and objectives. Satisfaction of organizational goals may entail the performance of multiple different activities by different agents and may require incremental or gradual progress toward goal attainment. The local agent may also interact with agents that have different organizational affiliations and different objectives and it may interact with other agents on a cooperative or self-interested basis. To further complicate matters, real agents in these environments are

hindered by bounded rationality, limited resources, and imperfect knowledge of the world and the activities being performed by other agents. Openness and dynamism also conspire against an agent's ability to schedule or plan far downstream temporally – leading to a requirement for efficient or soft real-time online control problem solving.

We view local agent control in this context as a real-time action-selection-sequencing problem where an agent has  $n$  candidate tasks and alternative different ways to perform the tasks. Tasks have deadlines and other constraints as well as different performance properties, e.g., consuming different resources or producing results of varying quality. Agent control from this view is an optimization problem; the problem is to choose which tasks to perform and how to perform them where the appropriate choice is dependent on the agent's context, which includes its relationships with other agents, shared organizational goals and individual organizational goals, current progress toward shared and individual goals, commitments made with other agents, and resource limitations.

Historically this class of control problem has been dealt with using the TÆMS task modeling framework [7, 17], GPGP coordination [7], and Design-to-Criteria (DTC) real-time agent scheduling [23, 29, 33]. Using these tools, an agent for use in a multi-agent environment is constructed by coupling a domain expert with GPGP and DTC. The domain expert then translates its internal representations into TÆMS for control problem solving by the coordination (GPGP) and trade-off/scheduling (DTC) experts. This is the approach used in work on repair team coordination [30], dynamic supply chain management [31], the BIG information gathering agent [19, 18], the Intelligent Home project (IHome) [16], and in the real-time agent sensor network for vehicle tracking [28].

In this paper we present the *motivational quantities* (*MQ*) framework which is a state-based model for organizational level control that addresses a set of issues not addressed by TÆMS. Control at the TÆMS level pertains to detailed evaluation of domain problem solving activities of an agent. Control at the *MQ* level pertains to high-level valuation of candidate tasks based on an understanding of the relationship between tasks and organizational objectives. In other words, in the *MQ* framework, task value is determined not only by the intrinsic properties of tasks, but by the benefits and costs of the intrinsic properties as determined by the agent's current organizational situation. From another view, there is an intermediate evaluation step in the control

process whereas such processes typically focus on intrinsic value rather than contextually interpreted value.

The two levels may be combined and interfaced by the *MQ* level selecting high-level tasks for the agent which are then decomposed into detailed activities modeled and scheduled at the TÆMS level. However, integration is unnecessary for some applications as the *MQ* framework stands on its own as a technology for organizational level control.

A preliminary version of the *MQ* framework was presented in [32]. The *MQ* framework is also being used to explore agent-based negotiation [36]. In this paper we refine the framework based on experiences gained by implementing and working with the model. This paper also extends it to support the concept of alternative performance profiles for tasks, and defines additional properties necessary for scheduling *MQ* tasks such as the implications of missing deadlines, violating earliest start times, or exhausting a resource supply. The refinements and extensions are necessary to actually use the model for agent control and to support reasoning about opportunity costs and future value. We also describe an implemented state based approach to scheduling *MQ*s (Section 3) that considers opportunity cost in control, and in Section 4, we present an example of control using the framework and its new associated scheduling technology. Strengths and limitations are discussed in Section 5.

## 2. QUANTIFYING AND COMPARING MOTIVATIONS

In the *MQ* model we make the control restriction that for an agent to perform a task, or to consider a task, the task must produce value for the local agent. On the surface, this implies that the *MQ* model is only for controlling interacting self-interested agents. This is not the case. The restriction is to guarantee the ability to compare tasks from a unified perspective. Consider the issue of task value. When agents are isolated problem solving entities, task performance produces value that is entirely of local benefit. In multi-agent systems, value may be of local benefit and of benefit to other agents. The extremes are also possible; tasks may be only of local benefit and tasks may be only of benefit to agents other than the local agent. This latter case appears problematic for the control restriction above: *all tasks produce local value*. This case is problematic only on the surface. For the local agent to consider performing such a task, it must indeed have value, however, in this case the value is of a different type or class than the value of its other candidate tasks. The task, for example, may be performed to meet some organizational directive, e.g., *service requests from agent  $\beta$* , or to reduce favors owed to the agent, to accumulate favors for future use with the agent, or because a different agent with which the local agent holds common goals requested it.

In the *MQ* framework, all tasks have value or a *motivation* for performing the task where the value is determined both by the value of the task and by the importance of the organizational objective with which the task is associated (and the current state of goal achievement). This enables the agent to compare and value tasks that are associated with different organizational goals, or tasks that are detrimental to one organizational goal while having positive benefit to a different organizational goal, or tasks associated with different organizations entirely, or tasks motivated by self-interested rea-

sons to cooperative reasons. The *MQ* framework quantifies these different underlying motivational factors and provides the means to compare them via a multi-attributed utility function. Definitions:

**Agents** are autonomous, heterogenous, persistent, computing entities that have the ability to choose which tasks to perform and when to perform them. Agents are also rationally bounded, resource bounded, and have limited knowledge of other agents.<sup>1</sup> Agents can perform tasks locally if they have sufficient resources and they may interact with other agents. Additionally:

- Each agent has a set of *MQ*s or *motivational quantities* that it tracks and accumulates. *MQ*s represent progress toward organizational goals<sup>2</sup>. *MQ*s are produced and consumed by task performance where the consumption or production properties are dependent on the context. For example, two agents interacting to achieve a shared organizational goal may both see an increase in the same local *MQ* levels as progress is made (this is not a zero sum game), whereas agents interacting to satisfy different goals may each obtain different types and quantities of *MQ*s from the same interaction.
- Not all agents have the same *MQ* set. However, for two agents to form a commitment to a specific course of action, they must have at least one *MQ* in common (or have the means for forming an *MQ* dynamically). If they do not have an *MQ* in common, they lack any common goals or objectives and lack any common medium of exchange. (Proxy and reducibility are somewhat addressed in [32].)
- For each *MQ*<sub>*i*</sub> belonging to an agent, it has a preference function or utility curve,  $U_{f_i}$ , that describes its preference for a particular quantity of the *MQ*, i.e.,  $\forall MQ_i, \exists U_{f_i}()$  such that  $U_{f_i}(MQ_i) \mapsto U_i$  where  $U_i$  is the utility associated with  $MQ_i$  and is not directly interchangeable with  $U_j$  unless  $i = j$ . Different agents may have different preferences for the same *MQ*<sub>*i*</sub>. Preferences in the framework are defined by the relation between task performance and organizational goals or directives.
- An agent's overall utility at any given moment in time is a function of its different utilities:  
 $U_{agent} = \gamma(U_i, U_j, U_k, ..)$ . We make no assumptions about the properties of  $\gamma()$ , only that it enables agents to determine preference or dominance between two different agent states with respect to *MQ*s.
- For simplicity of presentation, let us assume that  $\gamma()$  is not a multi-variate utility function and instead that for each  $U_i$  there is an associated function  $\omega_i()$ <sup>3</sup> that translates *MQ* specific utility into the agent's general utility type, i.e.,  $\forall U_i, \exists \omega_i()$  such that  $\omega_i(U_i) \mapsto U_{agent}$ . Thus  $U_{agent}$  may take the form of  $U_{agent} = \sum_{i=0}^n \omega_i(U_i)$ .

<sup>1</sup>As agents are heterogenous, they may be associated with different corporate entities (privacy issues), and because the contextual valuation of tasks is generally an exponential problem we do not assume agents know each other's utility functions, plan libraries, etc.

<sup>2</sup>In certain cases, *MQ*s may also be used as a medium of exchange. Though little meaningful work has been done to explore this.

<sup>3</sup> $\omega_i()$  could be combined with  $U_{f_i}()$ . These are partitioned for mapping different organizational influences.

- Change in agent utility, denoted  $\Delta U_{agent}$ , is computed through changes to the individual utilities,  $U_i$ ,  $U_j$ , etc. Let  $U_i$  denote the utility associated with  $MQ_i$  before the quantity of the  $MQ$  changes (e.g., as the result of task performance). Let  $U'_i$  denote the utility associated with the changed  $MQ$  quantity. The change in overall utility to the agent, in this simplified model, is expressed as  $\Delta U_{agent} = |\sum_{i=0}^n \omega_i(U'_i) - \omega_i(U_i)|$

**MQ Tasks** are abstractions of the primitive actions that the agent may carry out.  $MQ$  tasks:

- May have deadlines,  $deadline_i$ , for task performance beyond which performance of said task yields no useful results. (This could also be defined via a function that describes a gradual decrease in utility as  $deadline_i$  passes.) This temporal constraint, as with the one following, is particularly important for multi-agent coordination and temporal sequencing of activities over interactions.
- May have earliest start times,  $start_i$ , for task performance before which performance of said task yields no useful results. (This could also be defined via a function that describes a gradual increase in utility as  $start_i$  approaches.)
- Each  $MQ$  task consists of one or more  $MQ$  alternatives, where one alternative corresponds to a different performance profile of the task. In many ways, this extension simplifies reasoning with the preliminary model presented in [32] while at the same time increasing the representational power of the framework by coupling different durations with the other performance characteristics. Each alternative:
  - Requires some time or duration to execute, denoted  $d_i$ . The durations for all the alternatives of the task may be the same as the different alternatives may differ in other ways (below). Deadlines and start time constraints remain at the task level – the idea being that tasks have constraints that apply to all of the alternatives.
  - Produces some quantity of one or more  $MQs$ , called an  $MQ$  production set ( $MQPS$ ), which is denoted by:  $MQPS_{i,j,k} = \{q_i, q_j, q_k, \dots\}$ , where  $\forall i, q_i \geq 0$ . These quantities are *positive* and reflect the benefit derived from performing the task, e.g., progress toward a goal or the production of an artifact that can be exchanged with other agents. In this model, the two are equivalent.
  - Akin to the  $MQPS$ , tasks may also consume quantities of  $MQs$ . The specification of the  $MQs$  consumed by a task is called an  $MQ$  consumption set and denoted  $MQCS_{i,j,k} = \{q_i, q_j, q_k, \dots\}$ , where  $\forall i, q_i \leq 0$ . Consumption sets model tasks consuming resources, or being detrimental to an organizational objective, or agents contracting work out to other agents, e.g., paying another agent to produce some desired result or another agent accumulating favors or good will as the result of task performance. Consumption sets are the *negative* side of task performance.
  - All quantities, e.g.,  $d_i$ ,  $MQPS$ ,  $MQCS$ , are currently viewed from an expected value standpoint.
- Note that the  $MQPS_{alternative_i} \cap MQPS_{alternative_j}$  may  $\neq \phi$  as different alternatives may have common members. This is also true for the  $MQCS$ . The reason for this is that alternatives may represent producing different degrees of benefit ( $MQ$  levels) toward an objective as well as simply producing benefits toward different objectives (different  $MQs$ ).
- Tasks whose performance at a given point in time,  $t$ , will miss their deadlines should not be performed. Likewise with tasks whose performance violates their start time constraint. If such tasks are executed: 1) all  $MQCS$  will apply, 2) no  $MQPS$  will apply, 3) tasks will take their full duration to execute. Conceptually, this models performing the task, and consuming the task's resources, but having the task fail to produce any benefit.
- In any given alternative,  $MQPS$  and  $MQCS$  must be disjoint. The reason for this restriction is that in order to reason about an alternative producing and consuming the same  $MQs$ , we must have a detailed model of the execution characteristics of the alternative. For example, we must know when it consumes (at the beginning, at the end, linearly across the execution, etc.) and when it produces. This is not consistent with the  $MQ$  task abstraction – for situations in which such detailed reasoning is desired, the  $MQ$  task must be broken into multiple different tasks.
- $MQCS$  defines quantities that are required for task performance. If a task lacks sufficient  $MQs$  for execution it is deemed un-executable and will not be performed in any fashion. This means it will have zero duration, consume zero  $MQs$ , and will produce zero  $MQs$ .
- If a task will both violate a deadline/start time constraint and lacks sufficient resources to execute, the  $MQCS$ -lacking semantics will apply. The rationale is that the task lacks the resources to begin execution and thus does not actually violate the temporal constraints.
- Tasks may be interrupted, however, when this occurs they consume all  $MQs$  in the  $MQCS$  and produce none of the  $MQs$  in the  $MQPS$ . This restriction is to simplify the semantics for the reasoning process.

In this section we have presented a model for comparing tasks that are motivated by different factors. The model can support comparison between tasks that are performed for different organizational motivations to task that are performed for other agents in return for financial gain to tasks that are performed for other agents for cooperative reasons. Via the different preferences for the different quantities, agent control can be modulated and agents can reason about mixtures of different task types and different motivations. The use of state in the model also facilitates contextually dependent behaviors or adjustments to behaviors over time. Agent  $\alpha$  performing cooperative work with a closely allied agent,  $\beta$ , for instance, may need to balance this work with cooperative work with others over time. As  $\alpha$  accumulates progress toward goals held in common with  $\beta$  (represented as an  $MQ$ ), its preference may shift to the accumulation of other  $MQs$ . The use of utility for this application is flexible and very general and there are many

different ways to relate organizational goal importance to the process of task valuation.

The model relates to other recent work in the multi-agent community, such as agents interacting via obligations [1], or notions of social commitment [4], but it differs in its quantification of different concerns and its dynamic, contextual, relative, evaluation of these. The model resembles MarCon [21] as the different degrees-of-satisfaction afforded by the  $MQ$  model is akin to MarCon's constraint optimization approach, and MarCon too deals with utilities/motivations that cannot always be commingled. MarCon, however, views constraints as agents, assigning particular roles to particular agents, and the issue of which tasks to perform do not enter into the problem space.

In the sections that follow we discuss scheduling  $MQ$  tasks and present examples of using the framework for agent control.

### 3. SCHEDULING AND ANALYSIS

If the agent's objective is to simply select which task to perform next, and tasks do not have associated deadlines or earliest start times, and the present and future value of  $MQ$ s are equivalent, then it can reason using the maximum expected utility principle and select the task at each point that maximizes immediate utility. However, this simple choose-between-available-tasks model does not map well to situations in which tasks have individual earliest start times and/or deadlines. Note that in general, to coordinate the activities of multiple agents, temporal constraints such as these are needed to sequence activities over inter-agent interactions. In situations with such temporal interactions, it is difficult to produce optimal or even "good" results without considering sequences of activities and thus for most applications, scheduling of  $MQ$  tasks is required.

The implemented  $MQ$  task scheduler employs a generative state space search process where states record the agent's current  $MQ$  levels, utility functions, organizational roles and objectives, completed task set, candidate task set, and some estimation of the agent's future candidate task set. Transitions correspond to the performance of an  $MQ$  task. During the duration required for task performance (a transition), new tasks may arrive or the agent's organizational situation may change thus transitions can also be viewed as marking these changes as well. The  $MQ$  model was designed specifically to lend itself to this form of representation to ease reproducibility and to leverage the large body of research pertaining to state-based search. For example, the  $MQ$  model can be scheduled using standard real-time search technologies like SMA\* [24], RTA\* [15], and others [12], enabling the model to address the real-time requirement of online control for agents in open environments. This is particularly important because the search space is exponential in the number of actions being scheduled. Implementationally, the scheduler is unable to schedule problem instances of nine or more activities using exhaustive search<sup>4</sup> and other techniques are required. Depending on the characteristics of the problem instance, standard A\* may produce results in a reasonable amount of time on a larger problem instance, though, approximate rather than admissible heuristics are sometimes required to avoid exhaustive generation by A\*.

<sup>4</sup>On Pentium III class machine with 256 megabytes of RAM running Redhat Linux 6.0 and IBM's 1.1.6 jdk.

Scheduling issues beyond the scope of this paper include approaches for constructing good search heuristics in the face of non-linear utility curves and considering the future value of  $MQ$ s when estimating state potentials.

Opportunity cost also factors-into the scheduling process and into the estimation of the potential value of a given state. There are many different uses of opportunity cost in control and many different ways to compute or predict the future value of a unit of time. In the examples presented in this paper, the scheduler is configured so that opportunity cost is used to determine the value of a given activity relative to the time it requires to perform and it is computed using a running average of the amount of utility produced by the agent per time unit. Opportunity cost is tracked and expressed as a pair  $\langle OCM, Window \rangle$  where: 1) the  $OCM$  or *opportunity cost metric* expresses the current value of a unit of the agent's time, i.e., a utility-per-time-unit factor, and 2) the  $Window$  denotes the time over which the  $OCM$  was produced. The  $Window$  is necessary as time moves forward so the agent can reweight and adjust the  $OCM$  based on recent changes. As defined, opportunity cost is computed from the agent's initialization forward and will gradually be prone to little movement as weight ( $Window$ ) is accumulated. There are obviously many different variations for the running average computation. Once the value of a unit of time is computed, the issue then becomes how to employ it when considering a given  $MQ$  task or estimating the potential of  $MQ$  tasks for use in search heuristics. In this paper the opportunity cost of an  $MQ$  task will have the same weight as the utility produced by the task. If  $t_i$  is a task being evaluated:  $adjusted\_utility_{t_i} = utility_{t_i} - opportunity\_cost_{t_i}$ . Note that initially the agent's  $OCM$  is 0 and its  $Window$  is also 0, thus, in many cases the pair is "seeded" with initial estimations of appropriate values.

### 4. DEMONSTRATING CONTROL VIA $MQ$ S

In this section we demonstrate the use of the  $MQ$  model and the  $MQ$  task scheduler in an organizational control problem. The agent's objective in this example is to maximize its total utility over the set of candidate tasks. The agent in question is an *Information Gathering* agent for the Merrill Lynch corporation,  $IG_{ML}$ , and is situated in a network of financial information agents. The agent network is patterned after the the WARREN [6] style and the space is populated by three types of agents 1) *Database Manager* agents, 2) *Information Gathering (IG)* agents that are experts in particular domains and whose task is to plan, gather information, assimilate it, and produce a report, possibly accompanied by a recommendation to the client about a particular action to take based on the gathered information. 3) *Personal Agents (PA)* that interface directly with the human client, perhaps modeling the client's needs. These agents also decide with which information specialists to interact to solve a client's information need. In this paper, we focus on the interactions between  $IG_{ML}$  and personal agents for Merrill Lynch,  $PAML1$  and  $PAML2$ , that are associated with different Merrill Lynch employees.  $PAML1$  represents a mutual fund manager and  $PAML2$  represents an individual broker, thus, their requests must be evaluated differently by  $IG_{ML}$ .

In this scenario,  $IG_{ML}$  has the organizational roles and objectives shown in Figure 1. To track contributions toward

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**Organizational Membership**  $IG_{ML}$  belongs to a single organization (Merrill Lynch).

**Roles**  $IG_{ML}$  has two different organizational roles and all tasks performed by  $IG_{ML}$  pertain to one role or the other:

1.  $IG_{ML}$  has a *service role* that requires servicing requests and queries from other agents seeking information. In this example,  $IG_{ML}$  will service requests from  $P_{AML1}$  and  $P_{AML2}$ .
2.  $IG_{ML}$  also has a *maintenance role* that entails keeping its data repository up to date so that it may effectively service requests. In this role,  $IG_{ML}$  performs update tasks and exploration tasks. Update tasks entail verifying the integrity of its database by confirming that it has valid and current information on the known database management agents. Exploration tasks entail seeking out new database management agents and building profiles of such sources for inclusion into its database.

**Organizational Goals** Produce profit by servicing requests. Maintain quality of existing repository to ensure long-term revenue stability. Grow repository to improve coverage and to keep pace with the growth of networked information sources. Repository growth is considered particularly valuable at this time.

**Organizational Objectives** The organizational goals translate into several organizational objectives for  $IG_{ML}$ .

1. During any period (we will explore one period),  $IG_{ML}$  is to give preference to maintenance tasks until it has performed a specified amount and then it is to balance request service with maintenance on the basis of returns.
  2. Requests from  $P_{AML1}$  are *preferred* to  $P_{AML2}$  as they have a higher potential to produce more revenues for the company.  $IG_{ML}$  is thus advised to regard one unit of  $MQ$  from  $P_{AML1}$  as having approximately twice the value of one unit of  $MQ_{P_{AML2}}$ . (In this scenario there is no strict power relationship between the agents.)
  3. Exploration tasks contribute more to the maintenance requirement than update tasks as it is perceived that growth is currently necessary. However, exploration tasks require more time to perform.
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**Figure 1:  $IG_{ML}$ 's Organizational Context**

each of its organizational roles, and thus to monitor the state of its requirement to perform a certain amount of maintenance prior to servicing data requests,  $IG_{ML}$  will use two different  $MQs$ :  $MQ_{service}$  and  $MQ_{maintenance}$ . All tasks will produce some quantity of each of these  $MQs$  in addition to producing an  $MQ$  related to the task itself.  $IG_{ML}$  monitors and tracks the following  $MQs$ :  $MQ_{update}$ ,  $MQ_{explore}$ ,  $MQ_{P_{AML1}}$ ,  $MQ_{P_{AML2}}$ ,  $MQ_{service}$ , and  $MQ_{maintenance}$ . In accordance with the organizational objectives, the curve used for  $MQ_{P_{AML1}}$  is  $U = 2x + 2$  and for  $MQ_{P_{AML2}}$  is  $U = x + 1$ .  $MQ_{update}$  and  $MQ_{explore}$  are both assigned a curve of  $U = 2x + 2$ , though exploration tasks produce more units of  $MQ_{maintenance}$  per the objectives. We model the maintenance versus service objective by using a curve with two segments for  $MQ_{maintenance}$ :  $U = 2 * x$  when  $x \leq 5$  and  $U = x/2$  when  $x > 5$  (the specified quantity of maintenance  $MQs$  to produce before servicing requests is 5 in this example). For  $MQ_{service}$ , we use a constant curve of  $U = x/2$ . In all cases,  $\omega(U_i) = 1$ . In this scenario, tasks do not produce unit quantities of  $MQs$  but instead produce different volumes of  $MQs$ .

We will explore multiple variations using this model. First, we demonstrate appropriate agent control behavior given the organizational objectives. Consider the subset of  $IG_{ML}$ 's tasks and requests pictured in Figure 2. The tasks in the figure represent one half of the tasks assigned to the agent; there are actually two identical tasks of each task instance assigned to  $IG_{ML}$ , i.e., two requests from  $P_{AML1}$ , two requests from  $P_{AML2}$ , two exploration maintenance tasks and two updating maintenance tasks. Note that each of the tasks produce an  $MQ$  unique to the task type as well as an  $MQ$  relating to its broader organizational categorization (service or maintenance). The optimal schedule for  $IG_{ML}$  and the associated changes to the agent's state after each task is performed is shown in Figure 3 (the alternative identifier is omitted because each task has a single alternative).

In accordance with the specified objectives, the agent first elects to perform one of the exploration tasks. This produces the required five units of  $MQ_{maintenance}$  as well as two units

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Task: Update1
Alternative: Update1.0
Duration: 3.0
MQPS u MQCS: {(mq_maintenance 2.5),
               (mq_update 1.5)}
MQPS: {(mq_maintenance 2.5),
        (mq_update 1.5)}
MQCS: {}

Task: Explore1
Alternative: Explore1.0
Duration: 10.0
MQPS u MQCS: {(mq_maintenance 5.0),
               (mq_explore 2.0)}
MQPS: {(mq_maintenance 5.0),
        (mq_explore 2.0)}
MQCS: {}

Task: Request1_PAML1
Alternative: Request1_PAML1.0
Duration: 4.5
MQPS u MQCS: {(mq_service 1.0),
               (mq_paml1 4.0)}
MQPS: {(mq_service 1.0),
        (mq_paml1 4.0)}
MQCS: {}

Task: Request1_PAML2
Alternative: Request1_PAML2.0
Duration: 2.0
MQPS u MQCS: {(mq_service 1.0),
               (mq_paml2 5.0)}
MQPS: {(mq_service 1.0),
        (mq_paml2 5.0)}
MQCS: {}

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**Figure 2: Subset of Service Requests and Maintenance Tasks**

of  $MQ_{explore}$ . Because the utility curve for  $MQ_{maintenance}$  changes after five units are produced, the agent then elects to service requests for  $P_{AML1}$  rather than performing the remaining exploration task. Subsequent effort returns to the

Attributes & State	Task or Request Scheduled								
	Init	Explore2	Request2 PAML1	Request1 PAML1	Explore1	Request2 PAML2	Request1 PAML2	Update2	Update1
# in Sequence	n/a	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Start Time	n/a	0	10	14.5	19	29	31	33	36
End Time	n/a	10	14.5	19	29	31	33	36	39
Utility After	7	21	29.5	38	44.5	50	55.5	59.75	64
Level $MQ_{PAML1}$	0	0	4	8	8	8	8	8	8
Level $MQ_{PAML2}$	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	10	10
Level $MQ_{update}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	3
Level $MQ_{explore}$	0	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4
Level $MQ_{service}$	0	0	1	2	2	3	4	4	4
Level $MQ_{maintenance}$	0	5	5	5	10	10	10	12.5	15

Figure 3: Optimal Schedule and Control State Changes for  $IG_{ML}$  That Balances Maintenance and Service

remaining exploration maintenance task, then the service of requests for  $P_{AML2}$ , and finally the update tasks are performed. After the initial exploration task, and the change in  $U_{maintenance}$ , the choice between the exploration task, the two update tasks, and the requests for  $P_{AML1}$  is determined by the quantity of  $MQ$ s produced by each as  $U_{maintenance} == U_{service}$  and  $U_{explore} == U_{PAML1}$ . The requests for  $P_{AML2}$  are competitive with the update tasks for this same reason – though  $U_{PAML2}$  is dominated by  $U_{update}$  the requests for  $P_{AML2}$  produce larger quantities of  $MQ$ s than the update tasks.

Consider what happens if the organizational objective is changed and the maintenance objective is relaxed. In this case, the curve for the maintenance  $MQ$ s is the same as that used for the service  $MQ$ s, namely  $U = x/2$  at all times. The optimal schedule and the state changes for the agent are shown in Figure 4. In this situation, the utility produced by requests for  $P_{AML1}$  outweighs the benefits of the exploration tasks and they are performed first, rather than second. The exploration tasks are performed second, and the requests for  $P_{AML2}$  follow, and finally the update tasks are performed. When the organizational objective is removed, the resulting task / utility curve set produces a non-interleaved ordering for the tasks (as each task of each type has the same  $MQ$  levels). This underscores the role of the two-segment utility curve modeling technique of the previous example in mapping the organizational objective into utility for the first 5 units of  $MQ_{maintenance}$ .

Consider a different scenario. Figure 5 shows the optimal schedule produced if we reinstate the organizational objective to produce 5 units of  $MQ_{maintenance}$  before servicing requests, and, if we instruct the agent to factor-in the opportunity cost of the associated tasks. The agent is given an initial opportunity cost pair of  $\langle OCM = 1.0, Window = 100.0 \rangle$ . In this case, the agent elects to satisfy the maintenance requirement by performing both of the update tasks, each of which produces 2.5 units of  $MQ_{maintenance}$ , rather than performing a single exploration task (5 units of  $MQ_{maintenance}$  are produced by a single exploration task). This is because the exploration tasks require ten time units to execute and the update tasks require only three time units to execute. The utility state after each task without considering the opportunity cost of the task is given by *Utility After* whereas the utility adjusted to reflect opportunity cost is indicated by *Utility<sub>oc</sub> After*. Note that the exploration tasks are the least appealing options to the agent and are scheduled last in this scenario. Note also that the agent's *Utility<sub>oc</sub>* actually

decreases when the exploration tasks are performed. This is because the tasks' opportunity costs are greater than the utility they produce. Depending on how the agent is configured, it may elect to wait-and-see while adjusting its opportunity cost  $OCM$  and  $Window$  (as time moves forward) rather than performing the exploration tasks. In this case, the agent is configured to keep performing requests regardless. The first exploration task causes a net change in utility of  $-6.6$  while the second exploration task incurs a lesser change of  $-5.2$ . This is because after performing the first exploration action, the agent's  $OCM$  is lowered by the negative utility produced by the task so that the opportunity cost of the second exploration task is less.

## 5. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented and extended the  $MQ$  model for local agent control of organized agents and shown its use in different applications. The strength of the model is its use of state to obtain appropriate local control – the model does not require common social-level control assumptions like shared or visible utility functions, which are useful in applications where shared and static knowledge are possible or as a theoretical foundation, e.g., [10].

Inherent in the model's state-based design are the assumptions that: 1) agents have imperfect knowledge of the problem solving taking place at other agents; 2) the utility function of a given agent cannot generally be shared and computed by other agents because it is dependent on the agent's problem solving state; 3) globally optimal behavior can be approximated through local reasoning. In this latter case, the precision of the approximation is dependent on the degree to which agents can *communicate* or *observe* progress toward organizational objectives. Consider  $IG_{ML}$ 's maintenance requirement from the previous section. If the maintenance requirement could be met by another  $IG$  agent of Merrill Lynch, e.g.,  $IG_{MLB}$ , and  $IG_{MLB}$  decided to perform the required maintenance operations, the  $MQ_{maintenance}$  requirement of both  $IG_{ML}$  and  $IG_{MLB}$  would be met by  $IG_{MLB}$ 's operation. However,  $IG_{ML}$ 's recognition of this depends on communication between the agents, observation, default reasoning, plan inference, or a similar mechanism. The communications required are beyond the scope of the  $MQ$  framework though the framework is designed explicitly to support such activities. Using the  $MQ$  model, notions of social utility are decomposed and distilled into the control regime of local agents – a feature we believe is important for

Attributes & State	Task or Request Scheduled								
	Init	Request2 PAML1	Request1 PAML1	Explore2	Explore1	Request2 PAML2	Request 1 PAML2	Update2	Update1
# in Sequence	n/a	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Start Time	n/a	0	4.5	9	19	29	31	33	36
End Time	n/a	4.5	9	19	29	31	33	36	39
Utility After	7	15.5	24	30.5	37	42	48	52.25	56.5
Level $MQ_{PAML1}$	0	4	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Level $MQ_{PAML2}$	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	10	10
Level $MQ_{update}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	3
Level $MQ_{explore}$	0	0	0	2	4	4	4	4	4
Level $MQ_{service}$	0	1	2	2	2	3	4	4	4
Level $MQ_{maintenance}$	0	0	0	5	10	10	10	12.5	15

Figure 4: Optimal Schedule and Control State Changes for  $IG_{ML}$  When Maintenance Objective is Relaxed

Attributes & State	Task or Request Scheduled								
	Init	Update2	Update1	Request2 PAML1	Request1 PAML1	Request2 PAML2	Request1 PAML2	Explore2	Explore 1
# in Sequence	n/a	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Start Time	n/a	0	3	6	10.5	15	17	19	29
End Time	n/a	3	6	10.5	15	17	19	29	39
Utility After	7	15	23	31.5	40	45.5	51	57.5	64
Utility <sub>oc</sub> After	7	12	~ 16.8	~ 20.4	~ 23.8	~ 27	~ <b>31.2</b>	~ <b>24.6</b>	~ <b>19.4</b>
Level $MQ_{PAML1}$	0	0	0	4	8	8	8	8	8
Level $MQ_{PAML2}$	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	10	10
Level $MQ_{update}$	0	1.5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Level $MQ_{explore}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4
Level $MQ_{service}$	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	4	4
Level $MQ_{maintenance}$	0	2.5	5	5	5	5	5	10	15

Figure 5: Optimal Schedule and Control State Changes for  $IG_{ML}$  When Opportunity Cost is Considered

application in large-scale MAS.

Intellectually, one of the contributions of the model is the attempt to address complexity in MAS – complexity that is even more important as we move to large-scale MAS and persistent agents. Agents in complex environments, having multiple organizational objectives and different relationships with other agents, require a certain level of complexity in their objective functions and in their action and situation models.

Another important characteristic of the framework is its support of local approximation of the global optimization problem of a large group of interacting agents. Aspects of this include the idea that different activities contribute to different aspects of the global objectives, the need to consider of history or state in decision making, and that in certain situations there are interactions between the local utility computations of different agents.

To summarize the model's positive attributes: 1) it enables organizationally appropriate behavior through local agent reasoning, 2) it is amenable to real-time control problem solving and this problem solving is fairly straightforward to reproduce as a state-based search, 3) the model is well suited to adjustable degrees of approximation – it can be optimal in a non-local sense when complete information is available and it can be very coarse when agent's have little information about the activities of other agents, 4) the model provides a unified evaluation framework for agent activities, 5) it represents aspects of the complexity inherent in large MAS.

In terms of problems and limitations, one attribute of the model that has not been explored in any meaningful fashion is use of  $MQs$  as a medium of exchange. It appears that such exchanges are synonymous with an agent performing a

task that is of benefit to one of its organizational objectives while detrimental to another, however, further research in this area is required.

The most significant criticism of the model is that the translation of organizational structure into  $MQs$ , utility curves, initial  $MQ$  assignments, etc., as presented in this paper is ad-hoc. Though it required little knowledge engineering to produce the desired control behavior, experiments with a randomized assignment of  $MQ$  quantities to tasks illustrate a potential problem. Without design principles to guide the mapping, or appropriate corresponding verification techniques, it is difficult to be confident that a given mapping will result in the desired control behavior in the local agents. Ideally, the mapping of organizational objectives to organizational roles, the assignment of roles to agents, and the decomposition into  $MQs$  should be automated or performed by an organizational design component. Given the complexity of the problem, design principles and an approach for verification are the natural next step.

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